India’s nuclear isolation ends : NSG grants historic waiver,India and the World, News Analysis, India News Online

India last week secured a historic waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) by consensus to carry out nuclear commerce ending 34 years of isolation and taking the Indo-US Nuclear deal a step closer to fruition. Overcoming fears of obstacle after three days of tortuous negotiations in Vienna that saw China, Austria, Ireland and New Zealand holding out till the last minute, the revised US draft finally got the approval of the 45-member NSG meeting in the wee hours of September 6.

The NSG decision waives the requirement of “full-scope safeguards” as a condition for the cartel to export nuclear material and fuel for use in safeguarded Indian facilities. In effect, the move will allow India to resume civil nuclear cooperation with the world despite possessing nuclear weapons, something the NSG guidelines have barred since 1992. Even though one further American domestic hurdle must be crossed before India will be able to import nuclear items from the United States, the decision by the NSG means that New Delhi will now be able to enter into agreements with other major nuclear suppliers such as Russia and France with immediate effect.

The NSG waiver incorporates a reference to the statement issued by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee reiterating India’s non-proliferation commitments, including its voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.” Though the text of the waiver is still to be released, according to diplomatic sources, it describes these commitments as the “basis” for the NSG’s decision to exempt India from the requirement of full-scope safeguards, but does not provide for the automatic termination of nuclear supplies by all members in the event of India violating its commitments.

The consensus could be reached after 76 hours of high drama and hectic consultations when as many as 50 amendments were proposed and several countries such as Austria, New Zealand and Ireland backed by China objected to many draft proposals.

Ironically, the NSG came into being 34 years ago as a response to India’s 1974 Pokhran nuclear weapon test and yet on September 6 the NSG bent its rules to accommodate India’s nuclear ambitions. The deal will not just give India access to nuclear fissile material and technology to mount a credible nuclear energy programme. It will also open up certain key high-tech industries such as Pharma, IT, Space and Defence. India can now carry out nuclear trade, gets option for nuclear power and access to sensitive high technology that serves industry but is also used for nuclear technology. India would get closer to the US, France, Germany, UK and other European countries which will be wooing New Delhi to win nuclear trade contracts. India-China ties could, however, get frosty. The de-hyphenation with Pakistan will be complete. India now is in the category of responsible nuclear powers with an impeccable non-proliferation record. The speed of India’s nuclear transformation is stunning. India was in the nuclear doghouse after the Pokhran II test in 1998. Today it is one of the six nations that can buy nuclear merchandise and retain a nuclear arsenal.

The next step for America will be to take up the Indo-US 123 Pact when Congress meets on September 8. It must be approved by Sept. 28 when the Congress session ends. President Bush is expected to ask Congress to skip the mandatory 30-day period required for putting up the pact for approval. Both sides may sign a pact when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh goes to the US at this month’s end to attend the UN General Assembly Session. India will then sign similar pacts with other nuclear suppliers.

The waiver came even as the Manmohan Singh Government was trying to salvage the Indo-US nuclear agreement which came under fire after the leakage of a letter ahead of the NSG meeting. The letter by the State Department to a US Congressman said, “Washington will terminate nuclear trade with India if New Delhi conducts a nuclear test”.

NSG negotiations

When the NSG convened for its second plenary in as many weeks on September 4, several countries objected to the draft proposal that had been circulated by the US. Though the draft had been revised to address the non-proliferation concerns by them at the August 21-22 meeting of the group, Ireland, Austria and New Zealand demanded substantial changes and vowed to block the decision unless these were incorporated. What followed were two days of endless consultations. As drafting language flew back and forth within NSG steering committees and between the US and India, a final revised text was “frozen shortly before11.30 p.m. on Sept. 5. But these three states as well as China said they would not approve the text without instructions from their respective capitals. Renewed attempts were made to convince the holdouts before the plenary reconvened shortly before 2 a.m. on Sept. 6 for the tabling of the text. Overnight political intervention by India end the US proved decisive.

Three-way negotiations between America, India and the six hold- out continued until the end over the wording and structure of the US proposal to allow nuclear commerce with India. The six holding out countries (Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland) and other sceptic States were demanding tough conditions to be written into the draft proposal granting India an exemption from the NSG rules.

After the first NSG session of August 21-22, about 15 countries and six diehard opponents of the deal had tabled some 50 amendments to the text of the waiver. A second revised draft was circulated by the US among NSG members on Aug 29 with two changes. One, that the NSG’s own guidelines – Para 16 - would come into force if India did not play by the rules, That took care of the “testing issue” without mention in it. Second , that a review system would be set up which would be consultative rather than the intrusive regime India had objected to.

When the NSG reconvened on Sept, 4 , it was clear that was not enough. Countries like the Netherlands, Austria, New Zealand, Norway, Ireland and Switzerland remained part of the “happy six” who said they wanted more. It triggered a gruelling diplomatic ordeal. Suspense heightened on the second day on Sept. 5 when China reportedly threw a spanner. But the US pushed hard with a revised draft to bring naysayers on board for a consensus. As soon as the NSG convened for the second day, work started on redrafting of the waiver to accommodate the concerns of the skeptic countries while ensuring that no clauses were incorporated which would bind India. China which remained silent so far too raised questions over some aspects of the draft.

The Indian delegation led by Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon worked with the representations of these countries until the early morning on Sept. 6, making all out efforts to ally their concerns . At the end, China told the Indian delegation that they will back the initiative. Austria was the last country to say ‘yes’, pleading a consensus. While the diplomats of 45 countries were brainstorming in Vienna at political levels, President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prodded the skeptic countries to support the initiative in favour of India.

Mukherjee statement turns the tables on critics

The major turning point came with the issuance of a statement by External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee in which he talked about India’s abiding commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation system and unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

In a statement issued in New Delhi on Sept. 5 Mukherjee reaffirmed New Delhi’s commitment to a voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing , assuring the international community that India would not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing transfers. Pointing out that India did not subscribe to any arms race including a nuclear arms roll, the minister said: “We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibilities. We affirm our policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons.” India, he said, was committed to the work with other countries towards the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the conference on disarmament that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable. The Minister further said India supports international efforts to limit the spread of ENR (enrichment and reprocessing) equipment or technologies to States that they do not have them.

The idea of Mukherjee making a statement to mollify the concerns of countries with strong views on proliferation was earlier discussed with Foreign Secretary Menon and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Special Envoy, Shyam Saran, with the representatives of the hold-out countries informally in Vienna. Diplomats of these countries got in touch with their governments to brief them on Mukherjee’s statement to get their response.

The statement of Mukherjee generated a momentum at the discussions at the NSG meeting which welcomed and praised it. It was seen by NSG members including the representatives of the skeptic countries who saw lot of their concerns being addressed through it. A revised draft was reworked and sent for approval by the US in consultation with India.

Though India resisted attempts to include Mukherjee’s statement as a formal part of the NSG decision, a compromise was struck by making a reference to it in the paragraph three of the waiver. Thus, India’s non-proliferation commitments, as reiterated by the statement of Mukherjee were described as the basis for the NSG members to adopt their waiver. One consequence of the reference to Mukherjee’s statement, however, is that the NSG – which includes the five official nuclear weapons States as members, has acknowledged India’s no-first-use pledge and by default the reality , if not the legitimacy of the possession of nuclear weapons.

Incidentally, China abstained at NSG waiver talks. But, the Chinese diplomats earlier worked with the six nuclear hold-outs at the NSG to make the draft waiver as tough as possible. A little before the NSG meeting got under way, a commentary in China’s official paper, PEOPLE’S DAILY, called the deal “a major blow” to non-proliferation. However, subsequently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Jiang Yu, refused to endorse the criticism of the deal by the main Communist Party newspaper.

Revised draft

Although the text of the NSG waiver, as finally approved, is yet to be released, the new draft was not substantially different from the old one. The NSG skeptics proposed 50 amendments to the original draft. The revised draft contained changes that were neither cosmetic nor dramatic. However, two significant clauses have been added in the revised draft. One pertains to a rather intrusive monitoring of India’s nuclear business with partner countries that would entail constant exchange of information at the NSG between all the countries bilaterally engaged with India. The second, a far more important insertion, says, if these countries “consider that circumstances have arisen which require consultations, participating governments will act in accordance with paragraph 16 of the NSG guidelines.” This NSG guideline ties up with the Hyde Act which states that America would “seek agreement among NSG members that violations by one country of an agreement with any NSG member should result in joint action by all members, including, as appropriate, “the termination of nuclear exports.” The NSG draft does not give India a trade rule exemption on this count.

As the draft stands, the termination of supplies to India following consultations based on Paragraph 16 of the NSG guidelines would still have to be based on a decision taken by the whole NSG by consensus. There is no automaticity. Any country, especially a major supplier like Russia could effectively block such a decision, a fact pointed out by those NSG members critical of the new draft.

Last time, consensus broke down on three main points – what happens if India tests another nuclear device, whether India should get enrichment and reprocessing technology and whether India would come under some kind of a review programme. The first was the subject of heated debate. The new draft said, “In the event that one or more participating governments consider that circumstances arisen which require consultations, participating governments will act according to paragraph six of the guidelines” which says that if there is a violation of supplier/recipient understanding, particularly in the case of explosion of a nuclear device or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards, the recipient /supplier countries should promptly hold consultations. If the recipient country is found guilty the supplier countries should agree on an appropriate response and possible action which could include the termination of nuclear transfers. Many countries at the NSG meeting felt that the language was too weak.

Simply put, New Delhi’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is being made into a multilateral legality whereby if India were to test in the future, not only the US but all NSG members doing nuclear business with India will withdraw cooperation, as per paragraph 16 of the NSG guidelines.

Taken together the changes suggested that a serious attempt has been made to grapple with the more than 50 amendments which were demanded the last time the NSG met while remaining mindful of red lines India had itself laid down. In paragraph (a), what was earlier, a reiteration of the NSG’s desire to contribute to the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has now become “objectives and provisions” of the NPT. This is a concession by India, since the “provisions” are what spell out the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, with the latter expected to have full-scope safeguards. Paras 1 and 2 also remove references to the NPT as the “traditional” non-proliferation regime and drop the idea of India being a “contributing partner” in the non-proliferation regime. These changes essentially are meant to allay the concerns of the NSG members that the NPT itself is in some way old or obsolete or that India is being accorded some special status within the regime despite its possession of nuclear weapons. Also para 1(b) now speaks of the NSG seeking to “avert” the further spread of nuclear weapons, rather than to “limit” it. Though several NSG states wanted a formal review mechanism – a red line for India which said this might jeopardize billions of dollars worth of investment – the new draft provides for the NSG members to notify each other of transfers to India and share details of their bilateral agreements with India. But consultation now shall be, inter alia, about matters connected with implementation of the “statement” rather than the “Guidelines” as it was in the earlier draft, thus more tightly highlighting the centrality of India’s non-proliferation commitments.

There are two other changes in the waiver which are significant. First, the link between India’s commitments and the NSG’s decision has been tightened. Earlier, the link sentence to the decision to waive the requirement of full-scope safeguards was simply. “In view of the above,” i.e. India’s commitments. Now, it says the NSG is deciding to waive the requirement “based on the commitments and actions mentioned above,” i.e. in the paragraph outlining India’s obligations. Though the connection is more direct, this wording falls short of the demand made by some to make the waiver decision explicitly conditional on India’s implementation of its commitments, something New Delhi has resisted.

Though many countries wanted explicit language terminating cooperation with India in the event of the country ending its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, the new draft stops short of introducing such a provision.

NSG waiver hailed by Govt, flayed by opposition

Although the agreement has been condemned as a sell-out by the Opposition parties, it has been hailed as historic by the Government and Congress Party leaders. President Bush spoke to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on telephone praising his strong leadership at home and Dr. Singh thanking him for his role in taking forward the nuclear initiative and the NSG decision to “adjust its guidelines” to enable civil nuclear cooperation between India and the international community.

Dr. Singh called the NSG waiver a “forward looking and momentous decision.” Pranab Mukherjee echoed the similar sentiment calling the waiver “a major landmark” . Welcoming the consensus , US Ambassador to India David Mulford said it was the culmination of years of hard work and cooperation between India and the US to bring India into the global civil nuclear mainstream. It will strengthen global non-proliferation, he said. In Washington, the National Security Council spokesman called it a historic achievement that strengthens the global non-proliferation principle.

In New Delhi a statement by the Congress Party quoting Sonia Gandhi praised Dr. Singh for his commitment to pursue with determination India’s integration with the global mainstream to meet energy requirements. The Congress Party spokesman called the waiver a unique development that confirms de-facto nuclear power status to the country. Leading business chambers also reacted positively. In a statement FICCI said the nuclear-deal with Washington would be beneficial for India in many ways.

Opposition parties, however, flayed the Government for surrendering India’s sovereign foreign policy and walking into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation trap laid by the US. BJP leader and former External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha said the NSG guidelines are as stiff as the American Hyde Act. India has lost for ever the right to conduct the nuclear test, he said. The CPI(M) slammed the waiver as not being an unconditional one and said its concerns on the Indo-US nuclear deal are far from over. CPI(M) leader Prakash Karat said, the waiver could not be called clean since the conditionalities of the Hyde Act remained. Sitaram Yechury, another Marxist leader, said, the waiver was not unconditional one and his party’s concerns on the Indo-US Nuclear deal are far from over.

Former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman P.K. Iyengar, a strong critic of the Indo-US nuclear pact said the waiver granted by the NSG to conduct nuclear commerce was more of a victory for the US than an Indian win. He said during the entire negotiation process at the NSG, India was obliged to respect countries like Austria, New Zealand and Ireland as nuclear suppliers. “What kind of suppliers are they, God only knows.” Former Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, A.N. Prasad, said, going through the various steps taken by the Government in the run up to the NSG waiver, it appears that our right to test now remains only academic, on paper and the option for all practical purposes has been given up.

State Department letter – N-deal will be off if India conducts test

Even as the Indian and US negotiators were working hard to reach consensus at the Vienna meeting of the NSG, a well-kept nine-month secret of the Bush Administration was out, reflecting how successfully President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh managed to hoodwink the Indian public into believing that the Indo-US nuclear agreement was a dream deal. It could cause embarrassment to the Manmohan Singh Government because it says the pact would be off if India conducts a nuclear test and the deal would not mean transfer of any sensitive technology to India or uninterrupted fuel supply – a contradiction of Dr. Singh’s assurances to Parliament .

The Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Howard L. Berman, on Sept. 2 released a 26-page letter written by the Bush Administration in January 2008 that clearly establishes the fact that the US will not sell sensitive nuclear technologies to India and would instantly terminate nuclear trade if India lifted itself-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Contrary to Dr. Singh’s statement in Parliament, the letter also clarifies that while fuel supplies are not pledged in perpetuity, India has agreed that “safeguards can and should be regarded as being “in perpetuity”.

Similarly, on the crucial issue of fuel supply assurances, the letter said, the US would help India with nuclear fuel only because of “disruptions in supply to India that may result through no fault of its own.” These reasons are cited as a trade war or market disruptions. “The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments”, the letter, which was published in THE WASHINGTON POST said.

The 26-page reply received from the State Department was made public by Howard L. Berman, and a known opponent of the deal. For the past nine months, there was considerable speculation in India over the State Department’s replies to queries from Congressmen on the nuclear deal which were sent to Berman’s predecessor, late Tom Lantos.

The most damaging part of the letter, however, is the fact that it categorically states that the Indian Government has all along been aware of these conditions attached to the deal. Dr. Singh’s assertion in Parliament last August that “detailed fuel supply assurances” by the US for “the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors” are reflected in full” in the 123 Agreement has been blatantly countered by the Bush Administration in the letter. The letter said India has been clearly told that all cooperation would cease if India tested a weapon. This runs contrary to the “elaborate multi-layered consultation process” that has been included in the 123 agreement and contradicts claims by the Government that the 123 agreement overrules the Hyde Act.

What is more damning for the Indian Government is the report in the US media that the contents of the letter were kept secret because it would have complicated matters during the trust vote in the Lok Sabha. “The answers were considered so sensitive, particularly because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the Government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, that the State Department requested they remain secret even though they were not classified”, said the WASHINGTON POST.

Strategic analysts say, the disclosures made by the US Foreign Affairs Committee clearly shows that [a] if India conducts a nuclear test, America will immediately abrogate the 123 agreement and take back all nuclear materials including fuel it has supplied; [b]There are no guarantees of perpetual fuel supply or provisions to stock for lifetime; [c] There will be no transfer of sensitive technology such as reprocessing technology; [d] The US does not consider the 123 agreement as the only document governing civil nuclear cooperation with India – its actions will also be dictated by the provisions of the IAEA.

This is what many of the critics have been saying for a long time. But, now, for the first time, these facts are being confirmed by the US State Department. The Indian Government continues to bury its head in the sand and insists that the 123 Agreement is the only thing it will look at . It is now made explicitly clear that the US Government does not share this view, nor will the NSG. The intention is clearly to cap India’s strategic programme and not allow it to grow or modernize. Any non-proliferation law which will enable them to do so that, will be applied. The Government also keeps tiredly reiterating that the 123 Agreement does not prohibit India from conducting a test. But, it fails to inform the people that if it conducts a test it will be punished by the cessation of all nuclear cooperation and the return of fuel.

Political observers say, the letter exposes the Prime Minister’s double speak in Parliament that “there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing.” He had also assured Parliament that the agreement would not “tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India’s security and defence needs.” The House Committee letter says India has been categorically told that all cooperation will cease if it conducts a test.

Although the 123 Agreement had held out the hope that sensitive nuclear technologies “may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment for this Agreement”, the letter says the Bush Administration has no intention of seeking an amendment to the agreement to allow sensitive transfers.

Contrast this with Dr. Singh’s assertion that “we will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation” as amplified in the 123 Agreement and that he had received “an explicit commitment from the United States that India should get the same benefits of civilian cooperation as an advanced country like the US enjoys.”

Though the Opposition called into question the assurances by the Prime Minister and flayed him for misleading the Government, the Foreign Office said there is nothing in the 123 Agreement which limits India’s right to conduct a nuclear test and that actual nuclear trade between the two countries would be conducted only on the basis of the existing trade laws and rules of both the countries. In a statement, the Foreign Office said on Sept. 4, India already has declared a unilateral moratorium on testing and this is reflected in the Indo-US joint statement of July 18, 2005. As far as the consequences of such an action in terms of reactions by other countries are concerned, these are in the public domain. “The 123 agreement was conducted with full knowledge of these consequences, the spokesman said.

Commenting on the disclosures, the Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Anil Kakodkar, said they do not take away anything India wanted and there was “adequate protection for its strategic programmes in the deal.” He said, India knew about the letter in January to Tom Lantos but was caught unawares by its release.

As opposition parties raised hell and hackles over the State Department’s letter, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said, the Government will not go beyond its commitment to Parliament on the Indo-US nuclear deal. “Whatever we are committed to will have to be achieved within that” he said. And, maintaining that India may not need to conduct nuclear tests “in all probability”, ruling Congress party spokesman Abhishek Manu Singhvi asked, did the Prime Minister ever tell anybody that India will have the right to test but the US will not have the right to react.

However, the letter set off a fresh political storm in the Indian capital, with both the Left parties and the BJP slamming the Manmohan singh government for “misleading and betraying” the nation and Parliament over some basic contentious issues relating to the deal. Crying foul, the BJP lambasted the Cong-led UPA Government of “standing completely exposed now” and of allegedly compromising the country’s vital national interests. It called for calling a special session of Parliament saying it wanted to move a breach of privilege motion there. The CPI[M] said its concerns on the nuclear agreement now stand vindicated. The Manmohan Singh government stands exposed, the CPM Politburo said in a statement. Prakash Karat said, they would shortly be meeting President Pratibha Patil and seek an immediate session of Parliament where they propose to move a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister.

Storm in a cup of tea

Political observers say clearly the non-proliferation lobby in the US, disconcerted that the NSG did not reject the proposal for a waiver in favour of India, initiated by the US, was not dejected outright and mounted a last-ditch attack, using the not-inconsiderable resources at their disposal, by prevailing on the current Chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Berman, a known opponent of the Indo-US Agreement, to release to the public what was apparently privileged information, in the form of the administration’s answers to 45 fairly technical and non-proliferation related questions.

This ill-advised action, by its very timing, a day before the NSG was scheduled to reconvene in Vienna, had clear mischievous intent and was meant to influence the doubters and fence-sitters in the NSG to propose amendments to the US draft that would certainly kill the deal, and embarrass the US delegation in the process. It seems however, to have achieved other, perhaps unwanted results — the revival of the domestic opposition in India and provoking Indian doubts of America’s bonafides.

An examination of the letter and its enclosure would seem to indicate that a storm in a tea cup is being interpreted as a tsunami — to quote a feverish TV channel, “a nuclear shock”. Firstly, Indian newspapers had, several months ago, reported not only the fact of the US State Department responding to a series of questions from the House Committee, but also that the correspondence was being kept from the public domain since some of the language might have been found embarrassing by the Indian Government. So why the surprise? On the substantive side, there does not appear to be anything new in the answers provided, whether on testing, on enrichment and reprocessing technology or on dual use items for the ‘design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies’. To start with, in an eerie echo of a debate which has taken place in India, a question was posed by the Committee “Does the Administration believe that the nuclear cooperation agreement with India overrides the Hyde Act?” In response, the answer is that “the proposed Agreement is consistent with the legal requirements of both the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act.” There is no direct response to the issue of what overrides which piece of legislation; clearly the last ‘expression of sovereignty of the US will prevail, according to their own Constitution — if the 123 Agreement is approved by the US Congress, that would obviously be the ‘last expression’; till that time, it is the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Hyde Act.

It is also interesting to note that the administration has repeated the assurance that the agreement is fully consistent with the “legal” requirements of the Hyde Act, not the political or other requirements.

On the issue of nuclear weapon testing: the PM has stated that just as India retains the sovereign right to test, the US retains the sovereign right to react to such action. These two sovereign rights were sought to be reconciled in the language of the 123 Agreement, by instituting a consultative process so that precipitate action is not taken. The problem area, of course is not the issue of testing, but of the continuation of fuel supply to India by the US in that event. Apart from the unlikelihood of India importing fuel from the US, the problem arises in the interpretation of the phrase “disruption of fuel supplies” and the joint convening of a group of friendly countries to “pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”. The US has clearly stated, perhaps for the first time that the “fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments.” Still, in response to a question on this specific issue, the answer is “ceasing nuclear cooperation with India would be a serious step. The United States would not take such a serious step without careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such action and the effects and impacts it would entail.”

The two very different points of view have been sought to be brought together in the 123 Agreement itself, though it may hold the seeds of future disagreement between the two parties. If political relations remain good, the likelihood of resolving such problems amicably increase; if political relations deteriorate, and there is no reason why they should, even smaller problems would assume major proportions.

The answers on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies are also not new; the US not only does not export such technologies, but has been trying to get the NSG, at earlier meetings, to agree to ban the export of such technologies to all ‘unentitled’ countries, so far with little success as there were objections from Canada, Brazil and South Africa. In the answers to the Congress, the US administration recognizes that India already possesses both enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Stopping export to India of these technologies would therefore be irrelevant.

Finally, on dual use items for ‘sensitive nuclear technologies’, one assumes that the reference is to possible use of dual use items for military purposes. That this would not be forthcoming has been known and has, not even been sought.

The shocked reaction of much of our electronic media and the immediate shrill cries of ‘betrayal’ and worse by the opposition parties are unlikely to be reflected in the NSG. After all, the NSG participants are aware of US laws and would not have been edified by this blatant piece of provocation. Yet, the discussions in the NSG continue; we would have to wait to see if the interests of major countries such as the US, France, the UK, Russia and even Germany prevail over those of the ideological inclinations of a few.

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